Introduction
Spatial equilibrium models have been used frequently to analyze interregional competition problems. Interregional competition issues associated with dairy industries in several countries including Japan have been examined with these models (e.g., Sasaki; Kobayashi; Hayashi; McDowell; Rayner) . Originally developed by Enke and Samuelson then refined by Takayama and Judge, spatial price equilibrium models have assumed that markets are either perfectly competitive or that they're completely monopolistic. However, the structure of dairy markets in most countries are often neither. Therefore, a more plausible model for analyzing interregional milk movements would be a spatial imperfect competition equilibrium model.
The purpose of this paper is to present a generalization of Takayama and Judge's spatial equilibrium model that allows for the incorporation of any degree of market structure from perfect competition to monopoly. The usefulness of the model is demonstrated with an application to interregional milk movements in the Japanese dairy industry with solutions generated and compared for alternative scenarios regarding the degree of market competition.
The Japanese Dairy Industry
Dairy policy in Japan features a quota system in the manufacturing milk market to prevent excess milk production from occurring because of higher than competitive market prices. As a result, the Japanese dairy industry can be divided into three distinct markets: the fluid market, manufacturing market within-payment quotas, and manufacturing market over-payment quotas.
Prices in the manufacturing markets are set by the government based on a deficiency payment program. For manufacturing milk sold within-payment quotas, prefectural milk marketing boards (the consignment milk sellers for farmers) receive deficiency payments equal to the difference between the guaranteed price and the standard transaction price for manufacturing milk. Both prices are determined by the national government: the guaranteed price is based on milk production costs, while the standard transaction price is based on dairy product market conditions, and all buyers of -manufacturing milk are required to pay this price. To discourage excess production, over-payment quota manufacturing milk receives the lower standard transaction price. Payment quotas for the guaranteed price are not given to individual producers, but to each prefectural milk marketing board.
Individual producers are paid the prefecture-wide uniform pooled price (weighted average prices for milk sold in the fluid and manufacturing milk markets).
Given manufacturing milk prices determined by the government, discriminated price formation for fluid milk occurs through negotiations between each prefectural milk marketing board and the processors it supplies. Since the fluid milk market is more price inelastic than the manufacturing milk market, the fluid market has higher prices. The structure of the Japanese milk market includes an oligopolistic group of consignment milk sellers (prefectural milk marketing boards) who allocate milk to maximize sales revenues, and a large number of perfectly competitive producers who receive pooled returns (blend prices). We refer to this situation as a "dual structure"
because dairy farmers are perfectly competitive in producing milk, while they are oligopolistic in selling it through their milk marketing boards. Previous spatial price equilibrium models have not accounted for this "dual structure" in the Japanese milk market.
Conceptual Model
Consider n milk producing and consuming regions with the geographical scope of producing Region i the same as consuming Region i. In each consuming region, there are three administratively different markets: the fluid milk market (FMMi), the manufacturing milk market within-payment quota (WPQi), and the manufacturing milk market over-payment quota (OPQi). Unit transportation cost for shipping raw milk from producing Region i to consuming Region j (Tij) is assumed to be the same for both fluid and manufacturing milk.
Buyers of fluid milk in each consuming region are assumed to behave as price takers, which is reasonable since there are many fluid processors in Japan. Within-payment quota milk is traded at the fixed guaranteed price, FPl, and the quantity of milk is limited to the fixed-payment quota. Over payment quota milk is traded at the lower fixed standard transaction price, FP2, and it is assumed that the demand for this milk is perfectly elastic. It is also assumed that each region has a linear marginal raw milk cost function and a linear fluid demand function, with all functions known by all agents (or consignment sellers).
Milk producers in Region i consign their annual milk supply, FS j, to Agent i. Agent i's role is to allocate farmers' milk among the 3n markets to maximize sales revenues net of transportation costs. The following notation is used based for the variables described above:
Dj: quantity of milk demanded in fluid marketj G=I, 2, ..., n), FSj: quantity of raw milk supplied and consigned in Region i (i= 1, 2, ..., n), PSi: marginal revenue net of transportation costs for each market for Region i (i= 1, 2, ..., n), Xjj: quantity ofraw milk shipped from Region i to marketj (i=l, 2, ..., n;j=l, 2, ..., 3n), Xj(n+j): quantity of raw milk shipped from Region i to the manufacturing milk market within payment quotas (WPQj) 0=1, 2, ..., n; j=l, 2, ..., n), X j (2n+j): quantity of raw milk shipped from Region i to the manufacturing milk market over payment quotas (OPQj) 0= 1, 2, ..., n; j=1, 2, ..., n), PDj: demand price in the fluid market j G= 1, 2, ..., n), PPP i : producer's pooled (blend) price in Region i (i= 1, 2, ..., n), Dj=ar~jPDj: demand function in fluid market j G= 1, 2, ..., n), FSj=-Vj+TljPPP j : marginal cost function for raw milk in Region i (i= 1, 2, ..., n), where PPPj -means marginal cost.
Tij: unit transportation cost of shipping raw milk from producing Region i to consuming Region j (i= 1, 2, ..., n; j= 1, 2, ..., 3n), Qi: limited quantity (payment-quota) paid the differences between the guaranteed price (FP1) and the standard transaction price (FP2) 0= 1, 2, ..., n), SPj: shadow price of the right to sell a unit of milk in the manufacturing milk market within payment quotas (WPQj) 0=1, 2, ..., n), Rj: total milk sales revenue net of transportation costs in Region i (i=l, 2, ..., n).
Using the above notation, Agent i's milk sales revenue maximization problem net of transportation costs can be expressed as:
( 1) Max: R j = :Ej=l npDjXij + Lj=l nFP 1xXj(n+j) + :Ej=l nFP2xX i (2n+j) -:Ej=13nTijXij.
Total revenue maximization problem for all n agents is expressed as:
(2) Max. ~=l nRj.
Agent its fluid sales revenue in market j (PDjX ij ) can be written as:
where m (m ' * i) indicates all agents other than i. When Agent i believes that a change in his fluid supply will cause changes in all other agents' fluid supply to market j, Agent i's "perceived" marginal fluid revenue in market j is:
where rij is Agent i's conjectural variation regarding changes in all other agents' fluid supply to market j caused by a change in Agent i's supply.
Using the relationship (4), the total revenue maximization problem for all n agents can be re specified as the following net social payoff maximization problem adjusted for imperfectly competitive markets (ANSP):
Max: ANSP = 1:1=l
~=lnXi(n+j) 5 Qj, for all j, Using the Lagrange function (L) with the multipliers, lv, OJ, and e for the constraints (6), (7), -and (8), respectively, the Kuhn-Tucker optimality'conditions for the maximization problem can be expressed as: (11), (12), and (13) indicates that each agent must equalize marginal revenue net of transportation costs across all markets where it sells milk. The equilibrium values can be calculated by the quadratic programming model solution.
The term, (1/~j)(rij + I)Xij, in (11) indicates the difference between the fluid demand price and Agent i's marginal revenue in market j. The greater the degree of market power by agents, the larger this difference. For example, in the case of perfect competition, the term becomes zero because rij = 1. On the other hand, the term becomes (1/~j)Xij when Coumot-Nash behavior (rij = 0) is assumed.
In this paper, Coumot-Nash behavior is assumed to illustrate the imperfect competition solution, and coalition among agents is treated as follows. To illustrate, consider Coumot-Nash Agent 1 whose "perceived" marginal revenue in fluid market j is PDj -(1/~j)Xlj. If Agent 1 forms a coalition with Agent 2, then marginal revenue for Agents 1 and 2's coalition is PDj -(1/~j)(Xlj + X2j). In the case of monopoly where Agent 1 forms a coalition with all other agents, marginal revenue for Agent 1 is PDj -(lI~j)(~=lnXij). Because any agent can sell the consigned milk individually or in coalition with some other agents, as a price taker or according to Coumot-Nash behavior, many combinations of agents' marketing behavior can be simulated. A tableau formulation and description of the model is presented in Appendix 1.
To complete the model, individual farmers' milk supply needs to be incorporated. Unlike the oligopolistic marketing behavior of agents, individual farmers' milk production is competitively determined. Producers in Region i, as price takers, determine their supply given the producer pooled price. That is, their production level is determined by equating marginal cost to the producer pooled price. Thus,
In the comparative static equilibrium, FSi in (18) must be equal to FS i given in the above milk sales maximization problem. To solve the model, the following iterative solution process is used to find equilibrium values for FSi.
First, the quadratic programming model is used to generate equilibrium fluid milk prices and equilibrium quantities of milk shipments in the sales maximization problem expressed by (5) to (16) 
An Application of the Model to the Japanese Milk Market
This model is applied to the Kyushu area of Japan as a case study. Region 1 includes Fukuoka, Saga, and Nagasaki prefectures, Region 2 is the Kumamoto prefecture, Region 3 is the Oita prefecture, and Region 4 includes Miyazaki and Kagoshima prefectures.
Based on the long run price elasticity of Kyushu milk supply by Ito (0.429), the Kyushu fluid demand price elasticity by , and the regional price and quantity observations in Table 1 To demonstrate how solutions vary based on market structure assumption, the model is solved for perfect competition, monopoly, and imperfect competition scenarios. To represent the perfectly competitive solution, the model is solved assuming that the four agents are all price takers. For the monopoly solution, the model is solved with the assumption that there is a coalition of four agents.
To represent imperfect competition, 15 separate combinations with price takers and Coumot-Nash players are solved. In the first case, the four agents are all individual Coumot-Nash players (Coumot Nash equilibrium). In the next cases, one agent is a price taker and the other three are individual
Coumot-Nash players thereby creating four combinations of market structure. For cases six to 11, two agents are price takers and the other two are individual Coumot-Nash players thereby creating six new combinations of market structure.-FinallYi in the last four cases, three agents are price takers and the other one is a Coumot-Nash player thereby creating four combinations. Although there are other combinations with coalitions, they are not analyzed since the purpose here is to simply demonstrate examples of imperfectly competitive solutions.
The "dual structure" spatial perfect competition solution is shown in Table 2 . In this case, virtually all raw milk is allocated to the fluid market, except for a trivial amount shipped to the within-payment quota manufacturing milk market in Region 4. There is also only a small amount of interregional shipments of fluid milk, mostly to Region 1. The amount of milk allocated to the fluid market in the perfect competition solution is substantially higher than the actual amount allocated (see Table 1 ). This is due to the assumption that agents act as price takers, which results in equality of price across markets net of transportation costs instead of equality across markets of "perceived" -marginal revenue net of transportation costs. Consequently, fluid milk prices and producer pooled prices in the perfect competition case are much lower than actual levels.
The "dual structure" spatial monopoly solution is shown in Table 3 . In this case, the allocation of raw milk to the fluid market is roughly one-half of the amount allocated under perfect competition, and also less than actual levels (Table 1) . Instead, the monopoly solution allocates significant amounts of raw milk to the within-and over-payment quota manufacturing milk markets.
The model predicts no interregional shipment of milk in all three markets. Because the own price elasticity of fluid milk demand is inelastic, restricting allocations to the fluid milk market results in higher pooled returns to farmers. In fact, producer pooled prices under monopoly are 30 percent higher than the perfect competition case, as well as 10 percent higher than actual prices. It should be noted that the monopoly distribution of pooled returns to farmers is based on the assumption that the difference in producer 'pooled price among regions is the same as the differentials generated in the perfect competition solution. Alternatively, one national producer pooled price for all regions could have been allocated. It should also be noted that total milk supply is largest in monopoly equilibrium under the "dual structure." Unless agents have power to control supply, individual producers increase milk supply as higher blend prices are given. Real monopoly rents cannot be realized under the "dual structure. "
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is shown in Table 4 . The regional fluid milk and producer pooled prices in this solution are the closest to actual prices for the four regions (Table 1) . Not surprisingly, the allocation of raw milk among the three markets in this case is somewhere between the perfect competition and monopoly cases. Unlike the two previous cases, however, the Cournot Nash equilibrium solution results in the same two regions shipping milk to each other, e.g., Region 2 ships 51,400 tons of fluid milk to Region 1, and Region 1 ships 29,500 tons of fluid milk to Region 2.
While these shipping patterns are unintuitive, they do occur in reality as is clear from Table 1 . The other two spatial competition models did not predict these interregional milk shipment patterns. This suggests that the current complicated interregional milk movements may be caused by imperfectly competitive behavior.
Compared with the other imperfect competition cases where at least one region is assumed to be a price taker (an example is given in Table 5 ), fluid and producer pooled prices in the Cournot Nash equilibrium solution in Table 4 are closer to actual prices. Price takers' returns tend to be greater than Cournot-Nash players when both price takers and Cournot-Nash players exist as is shown in Table 5 . This is because Cournot-Nash agents try to keep fluid milk prices higher based on their "perceived" marginal revenues, and price takers obtain benefits by moving their milk to the fluid milk markets. In this case, acting as a price taker is like "cheating" in a cartel agreement.
Conclusion
The traditional spatial equilibrium model assumes that market structure is either perfectly competitive or monopolistic. In this paper, a new, generalized "dual structure" spatial imperfect competition equilibrium model was developed which incorporates any degree of market structure from perfect competition to monopoly. The model, which was applied to the Japanese milk market as a case study, incorporated a "dual structure" in which there are oligopolistic consignment sellers and many perfectly competitive small-scale producers with pooled returns given.
Using the model, many spatial equilibrium solutions in the Japanese milk market were demonstrated assuming alternative sets of imperfectly competitive behavior with the "dual structure."
-
The results indicate that under perfect competition, most milk was shipped to fluid markets, and there were very few interregional milk movements and much lower milk prices than actual price levels. Under monopoly, much less milk was shipped to fluid markets, there was no interregional milk movement, and milk prices were much higher than the perfect competition solution and actual price levels. The Coumot-Nash equilibrium solutions were the most similar to actual observations, and the actual interregional milk movements could be explained by assuming imperfectly competitive behavior. Tables 3 to 5) .
bExogenously given milk shipments from each region to the outside of Kyushu are taken into account in calculating PPPj (Same in tables 3 to 5). 8Estimated PPP differentials in the perfect competition equilibrium in Table 2 are used to allocate monopoly pooled returns and to calculate PPPj of each region. 
Appendix 1 The Quadratic Programming Model in Tableau Form
A convenient way to explain a quadratic programming model is using Tableau form.
Appendix Table 1 briefly expresses the following concave quadratic programming problem. The problem is to find values for primal variables Xj 0=1, 2, ..., s) and dual variables Ui ~ 0 (i=I, 2, ... , r)
which maximize the objective function F:
aIlXI+aI2X2+ +alsX s ~ bl ;UI a2IX I+a22 X2+ +a2sXs~ b2 ;U2 Wj, Xj ~ 00=1,2, ... ,s), where aij, bi' Cj, and Wj (i=l, 2, ... , r;j=l, 2, ... , s) are constants.
The quadratic programming model in (5) to (16) in the text is expressed in quantity formulation with quantities as the primal variables. The model can be also expressed in price formulation with PDj, SPj, and PSi as primal variables. It is advantageous to solve the model under the price formulation because it is easier to solve computationally. The price formualtion using a tableau format defined in Appendix Table 1 is shown in Appendix Table 2 .
The following vectors of constants are used in Appendix Table 2: (i= 1, 2, ..., k) means the difference between PDj and marginal revenue of coalition i in market j (j= 1, 2, ..., n), which is equal to (1/~j)(rij + l)Xij in the relationship (11) and qij = (1/~j)Xij in the following cases where Coumot-Nash behavior is assumed. Ej is an nxn matrix, and any element of jth column is 1, but any element of ith (i:;tj) column is 0, where j= 1, 2, ..., n. 
L0 J
In this case, the columns for variables q21 and q22 in Appendix Table 3 should be deleted. If Agents 1 and 2 behave as price takers, then matrix A has no columns and is empty, therefore columns for variables qu, q21, q12, and q22 in Appendix Table 3 should be deleted. Another case would be where Agent 1 behaves in coalition with Agent 2 as a Coumot-Nash player. Under this situation, the following matrix A would be used:
L-1 J This matrix shows that there is a coalition composed of Agents 1 and 2, therefore columns for variables q21 and q22 in Appendix Table 3 should be deleted, and also columns for variables qll and q12 should be revised according to matrix A3.
• [
Step 2] Solve the quadratic programming model to get equilibrium fluid milk demand prices PDj (j= 1, 2, ..., n) and equilibrium quantities of milk shipments Xij 0= 1, 2, ..., n; j= 1, 2, ..., 3n) corresponding to the given specification. To illustrate, consider the following smaller two-region example. In this case, there are two regions, and producers in producing Region 1 (2) consign their milk supply FS I (FS2) to Agent 1 (2). Agents 1 and 2 sell the consigned milk individually as Cournot-Nash players in six (=3x2) oligopolistic milk markets: FMM I (market 1), FMM2 (market 2), WPQI (market 3), WPQ2 (market 4), OPQI (market 5), and OPQ2 (market 6). Milk is traded in market 3 (4) at the fixed guaranteed price FPl within the limit of payment quota QI (Q2), and milk is also traded in markets 5 and 6 at the fixed standard transaction price FP2 without any limit of demand quantity. The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions for the n=2 problem are the following: each agent's opportunity costs moving a unit of milk from market to market (or marginal revenue net of transportation costs for each market) PSI and PS2 must satisfy the following conditions:
where (RES.) means the difference between the right and left hand sides of the corresponding inequality.
The fluid milk demand prices PD I and PD2 must satisfy the following:
a2-~2PD2~ XI2+X22, (RES.)PD2=0.
The differences q11, q2h ql2, and q22 must satisfy the following: The shipment quantities Xll, XZI, X12, and Xzz must satisfy the following:
(PDI-qzl)-PS z 5 Tz I , (RES.)XzI=O.
(PDz-q12)-PS I 5 T12, (RES.)Xlz=O.
(PDz-qzz)-PS z 5 Tzz, (RES.)Xzz=O.
The shipment quantities X13, XZ3, X 14 , and X Z4 must satisfy the following: 
FP2-PSz 5 T zz ,
(RES.)XZ6=0.
We can get the following relations between the optimal values for qij and Xij 0= 1,2; j= 1,2) from the Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition for the problem. Let the total quantity of milk shipped from agents other than Agent i (coalition i) to market j be denoted by x. Then marginal revenue MRij of Agent i in market j can be written as follows.
where Xij is the quantity of milk shipped from Agent i to market j, equation PDj=(a/~j)-( 1/~j)Dj is the inverse demand function in market j, and i= 1, 2; j=1, 2.
The difference between demand price PDj and the marginal revenue MRij is equal to (1/~j)Xij and to the optimal value of qij, therefore MR ij is equal to (PDrqij). 
